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HAVA's Unintended Consequences: A Lesson for
Next Time
On October 29, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Help America
Vote Act Of 2002 (HAVA), a watershed in American election law.' Passed in the
wake of the 200o election -following Florida's "dimple" and "chad" fiasco and
its culmination in Bush v. Gore2 - HAVA was a comprehensive reform package
aimed at nearly all aspects of American elections. The Act set out to secure
individual voting rights, set national standards for acceptable voting
machinery, and enhance voting opportunities for members of the military and
persons with disabilities. Congress for the first time earmarked federal money
for state procurement of election equipment and established a new federal
agency to certify and test voting systems and to oversee the grant programs.'
HAVA provided fairly generous funding to the states to meet these goals. 4
The Act did not require states to accept funding or follow its rules, but it did
require states taking federal dollars to meet certain conditions. States that used
punch-card machines (which received much of the blame for the problems in
Florida) or lever-operated machines (which created barriers to voting for the
elderly, vision-impaired, and other disabled citizens) in the 2000 election were
required to replace all such machines with new equipment certified to meet
various standards.' And in all states accepting HAVA money, the Act required
1. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15,301-15,545 (Supp. I1 2002)).
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. Help America Vote Act § 104 (earmarking federal money); id. § 201 (establishing the
Election Assistance Commission).
4. Overall, the Act provided $3.86 billion to be spent on election reform. See id. §§ 104, 258,
264, 273, 283, 296.
5. See id. §§ 101-102, 301. For a discussion of the problems presented by punch-card and lever
machines, see infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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each voting precinct to operate at least one polling machine capable of
accommodating disabled voters.6 States were required to make these upgrades
by January 1, 2004, although a two-year extension was permitted for good
cause.7 Most punch-card and lever states took advantage of this two-year
extension,8 so the effective deadline for equipment upgrades was January 1,
2006.
Now that this deadline has passed, the long-lasting effects of the rapid
upgrade movement that HAVA spurred are starting to become clear. This
Comment points to one such effect: HAVA's strict four-year timetable has
encouraged and entrenched the practice of purchasing election equipment,
despite the fact that leasing may well be a better option. By encouraging
purchases, HAVA may have led-and may continue to lead-to relatively low
levels of investment and innovation in the market for voting machines. Worse
still, HAVA might also ensure that future upgrades occur only infrequently and
at great cost to state and local election agencies.
I. HAVA AND THE REPLACEMENT OF VOTING MACHINES
The 2000 election exposed a number of fundamental problems that had
been lurking in this country's election system. Voter registration systems were
decentralized, ill managed, and notoriously problematic on election day.9
Precincts around the country lacked any means of allowing voters not on the
polling list to vote provisionally or to challenge their exclusion after the fact. 1"
But the problem of voting machinery loomed largest in Congress," as
lawmakers contemplated the unreliability of the punch-card and lever voting
machines used during the 20oo election. Voters using punch cards often failed
6. Help America Vote Act § 301(a)(3)(B).
7. Id. S 102(a)(3)(B). Approximately 19% of voters nationwide still used punch-card machines
in the 2004 election. Daniel Tokaji, Voting Technology: From 2000 to 2004 . .. and
Beyond, http ://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part4/equipment-machinesoi .html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
8. Roads to Reform: Planning for the Help America Vote Act, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING, Aug.
2003, at 9, http://www.electionline.org/Portals//Publications/ERIP%2oBrie/2o8-03.Pdf
(hereinafter Roads to Reform].
9. H.R. REP. No. 107-329, at 38 (2001).
lo. See id. ("Studies of the nation's election system find that a significant problem voters
experience is to arrive at the polling place believing that they are eligible to vote, and then to
be turned away because the election workers cannot find their names on the list of qualified
voters.").
11. See id. at 38-39.
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to align the card behind the ballot perfectly, thereby casting votes for the
wrong candidates, and the machines sometimes failed to punch out the
perforated chad on the ballot, thereby nullifying the intended vote. 2 Lever
machines, which required voters to click switches corresponding to their
chosen candidates and then pull a heavy lever to cast their votes, created
barriers for elderly and handicapped voters, who were often unable to pull the
lever or reach the switches. 3 By the end of 2000, Congress found that "[l]arge
portions of the American public [had] lost confidence" in these antiquated
voting machines. 4 HAVA was thus enacted to enable the states to take
advantage of technological advances, including electronic equipment that
seemed to promise greater accuracy and accessibility. Outdated and
discriminatory equipment was to become, in Congress's words, "a part of our
history, not our future.""5
Overall, HAVA authorized $65o million for appropriation to the states, half
of which was devoted exclusively to the replacement of punch-card and lever
machines, and it also made available a larger pool of money for general use by
the states.' 7 Crucially, any money unspent by the final deadline of January 1,
2006 was to be repaid to the federal government."
In response to this time pressure, most states have taken and spent their
federal grants. Between 2002 and 2004, many states took a conservative stance,
preferring a wait-and-see approach to evaluate the success of particular
machinery elsewhere before acquiring it. In Missouri, for example, only four of
the thirty-seven districts using punch-card machines in 2002 had replaced
them in time for the 2004 election; most districts were hesitant to act before
others had tested the equipment. 9 But by 2006, at least thirty states had begun
12. See id. at 32. Florida officials were faced with the "unenviable task of attempting to divine
the intent of a voter based on the amount of depression or partial detachment of a chad." Id.
13. For one vivid account, see Amanda Zafian, Disabled Still Frustrated by Voting in New York
(Nov. 5, 2002), http://faculty-staff.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/election/2002/problems/
disabled-zafian.asp.
14. H.R. REP. No. 107-329, at 32.
15. Id.
16. Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 104(a), 116 Stat. 1666, 1672 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15,301-
15,545 (Supp. II 2002)).
17. Id. § ioi(a)-(d). States predominated by punch-card and lever machines allocated the bulk
of all HAVA money to voting machine replacement. See Roads to Reform, supra note 8, at 2-3.
18. Help America Vote Act § 102(a)(3)(A)-(B), (d)(i).
1g. See Paul S. Herrnson, Improving Election Technology and Administration: Toward a Larger
Federal Role in Elections?, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 151-52 (2002).
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to upgrade their voting machinery, financing the change mainly with HAVA
money."
HAVA permits the states to use federal funds to acquire new machines in
virtually any form of transaction, whether "by purchase, lease, or such other
arrangement as may be appropriate."'" Although most states officially allow a
choice between purchase and lease,2 purchasing nevertheless predominates.2 3
As a general matter, states and precincts ' tend to view leasing as a measure of
last resort. For instance, the Maryland legislature recently authorized spending
for the lease of optical scan machines for the 2006 election season. But it did so
only on a temporary basis: the state has already spent $90 million to purchase
a touch-screen system from the producer Diebold, Inc. and is using the leased
system only until security and reliability concerns about Diebold machines can
be resolved.2"
II. A BETTER WAY TO UPGRADE
From a national perspective, American voters would be better off if states
and precincts leased their machines for relatively short terms (say, ten years)
2o. DOUG CHAPIN ET AL., ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT
HASN'T AND WHY 2000-2OO6, at 9 (20o6), http://www.electionline.or/Portals/l/
Publications/2oo6.annual.report.final.pdf. A handful of states have lagged behind, failing to
upgrade in time "for a variety of reasons, ranging from concerns over voter-verified paper
audit trails. . to inaction at numerous levels of government." Id. New York has experienced
the most notable failure, probably due to government inaction. See United States v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Elections, No. o6-CV-o263 (N.D.N.Y. June 2, 20o6), available at
http://www.nyvv.org/doc/USCourtOrdero6o2o6.pdf.
21. Help America Vote Act § lo2(a)(2).
22. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19,004 (West 2003) ("Voting equipment may be loaned or
rented for any purposes ... ."); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 54, § 34 (1991) ("A city or town may
... purchase, lease, or lease with an option to purchase, one or more voting machines
.... .).
23. HIAVA required each state to file a "state plan" detailing the manner in which it would
comply with the Act's requirements, Help America Vote Act §§ 254-255, and a survey of
these plans confirms that purchasing predominates, see, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,
STATE PLAN 36 (2003), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ELE/elepdf/havafinal.pdf; Roads to
Reform, supra note 8, at 12-18. Media coverage also confirms the purchasing trend. See, e.g.,
Michael Cooper, Albany Leaves Choice of Voting Machines to Counties, N.Y. TIMES, May ii,
2005, at B8; Stuart Pfeifer, Supervisors' Committee To Study Election Problems, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2004, at B3.
24. Ultimate procurement decisions are made differently in each state, but they typically involve
an approvals process at the state level and an acquisition decision by local election officials.
25. See Anne E. Marimow, Ehrlich Seeks To Fund Voting Machine Change, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
2006, at B4.
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rather than purchasing them outright. Large private businesses have already
become wise to the benefits of leasing over purchasing. At one time, large
banks, law firms, and other companies purchased their office technology.
Today, because technology changes so quickly and because companies only
value a fraction of a product's potential life, they prefer to lease their
equipment. 6
The voting industry experiences similar conditions to the private sector, in
that the features demanded change rapidly, often in response to newly
discovered flaws and problems. In the past four years alone, standards for
security, functionality, and accessibility have fluctuated greatly. For example,
the move to electronic machines triggered concerns over technological
tampering and a desire for "voter-verified audit trails" 7 that led to the return
of paper ballot systems.2" In the past two years, hybrid machines have become
the hot item in the voting machine market. Systems such as the ES&S
AutoMARK provide the benefits of an electronic interface with the easy
counting features of optical scan ballots.2 9 But even the most recent machines
are believed to be imperfect: "Concerns about punch cards and lever voting
machines have given way to concerns about their replacements."3
In this environment, purchasers have found themselves either stuck with
imperfect machines or fearful of proceeding with acquisitions until a particular
product has proven itself successful elsewhere in the market. California
counties, because they are unable to purchase more than a few machines at a
time, have "lurched from one voting system to another as the state has written
and rewritten standards."3 1 Maryland found its statewide purchase to be a sour
investment when a new problem came to light after the machines had been
delivered.32 And, as the 2006 election approaches, a number of states risk
noncompliance with HAVA as a result of the pressure to choose a system
whose technology will last.33
26. For instance, the desktop computers at large law firms are more likely to be leased than
purchased. See, e.g., Andrew M. Appel et al., More Bang for the IT Buck, MCKiNSEY Q,. Apr.
2003, at 130.
27. Roads to Reform, supra note 8, at 8.
28. See CHAPIN ETAL., supra note 20, at 5.
z9. See Election Sys. & Software, ES&S AutoMARK, http://www.essvote.com/HTML/
products/automark.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
30. CHAPIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 5.
31. Noam N. Levey, Voting System Results Still Out, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at Al.
32. See Kelly Brewington, Voting Bill May Clear House: Measure Would Change Md. Ballot
Machines, BALT. SUN, Mar. 7, 2oo6, at iB.
33. As discussed supra note 20, New York is the most infamous among this pack.
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These problems could at least be minimized by a short-term lease
requirement. First, and most simply, leasing would induce more frequent
machinery upgrades. Whereas purchasing can lead to lock-in,34 leasing
provides frequent opportunities to renegotiate or find more up-to-date and
inclusive machines. The expiration of a lease would actually force each lessee
municipality to reconsider its holdings and potentially to shop around for
better technology every few years. Voting technology is rapidly evolving.
Today, for example, voters can cast ballots on touch-screen machines
resembling ATMs;35 on direct recorded electronic voting machines, which
create a paper record while maintaining voter anonymity;, 6 or using audio
devices, a boon for visually impaired and blind voters37- all of which would
have been unthinkable a few decades ago. Leasing would enable states to take
advantage of these innovations as they become available, whereas outright
purchase does not.
At most, a poor choice of machinery or subsequent technological
innovation would affect one or two election cycles, after which it would be
simpler to correct the problem in the next round of negotiations. Of course,
frequent change and multiple upgrades carry the risk of voter confusion or
technical inaccuracies and malfunctions. But even if these risks are substantial,
a state or locality would consider any potential for additional confusion or
malfunction as a cost in its decision-making process. Not every government
would benefit from switching machines frequently; many would probably opt
to maintain the status quo. But at least in a leasing scenario officials would
34. New York's 7639 lever-operated machines were built more than four decades ago. Frank
Lombardi, Vote's Out on City Meeting New Fed Law, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, May 24, 2005, at 5,
available at http://www.nydailynews.coi/news/politics/story/3123o0p-26717oc.html. Due to
a combination of inaction, indecision, and ineffective government, the state still has not
upgraded and has said it will not do so in time for the 2006 elections. See United States v.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. o6-CV-o26 3 (N.D.N.Y. June 2, 20o6), available at
http://www.nyvv.org/doc/USCourtOrdero6o2o6.pdf.
35. For one demonstration, see Diebold Election Sys., Demos, http://www.diebold.coni
dieboldes/demos.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 20o6).
36. For example, the AccuVote TSX, made by Diebold, can be configured with a printer module
that provides a verifiable paper trail, and the iVotronic, made by ES&S, can accommodate a
"real time audit log" that does the same. See Diebold Election Sys., Comprehensive
Solutions, http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/solutions.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 20o6);
Election Sys. & Software, iVotronic Real Time Audit Log, http://www.essvote.conVHTML/
products/ivotronic_rtal.html (last visited Oct. 14, 20o6).
37. For a discussion of these devices, see Verified Voting Found., Accessible and Verifiable
Voting Technology: Vision (Aug. 16, 2005), http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/
article.php?id=6114#audio.
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undertake regular evaluations and consider the benefits and costs of keeping
the current machinery.
Second, leasing would shift the risk of obsolescence to the private sector.
From an economic perspective, this risk ought to be borne by producers
because they are in the best position to minimize the risk. They alone can
produce longer-lasting and more adaptable machines, and placing the risk on
their shoulders would incentivize them to do so. Moreover, compared to states
or local governments, private companies would be better suited to own
outdated machines because they are better equipped to refurbish old machines,
fix glitches, and make the case for continued use of their machines."
Finally, by ensuring more frequent points of entry, leasing could encourage
newcomers to enter the voting machinery market. Today, the industry is a
highly concentrated one: the two largest suppliers of election equipment at the
time of the 2002 Act-Diebold, Inc. and Election Systems & Software, Inc.
(ES&S) -accounted for roughly 8o% of the votes counted in the 2004
presidential election.39 With new entrants, the industry might become more
competitive: companies in adjacent industries (such as PCs, business
equipment, etc.) might themselves invest and innovate, and the current players
would, in turn, have to invest more and innovate more. This greater
competition could bring higher quality and lower prices- both of which would
encourage even more rapid change, to the benefit of American voters.
As everyday experience with cars suggests, leasing and frequently
upgrading machinery could cost more in the long run. The first few years after
acquisition are the most valuable, and consistently paying for only those years
would likely cost more over time than would infrequent sales agreements
under which states extracted a greater number of years from each machine. Yet
states should still choose leasing for the same reasons that people still lease
cars: it is worth paying a small premium for the option to periodically adopt
the latest technology.
III. HAVA AS A BARRIER TO CHANGE
Many election officials harbor an aversion to leasing-their districts have
owned machinery for so long that purchasing seems natural. For instance, in a
telephone interview, a California county official responsible for the purchase of
38. The private sector could even exploit secondary markets for voting machines-a challenge
municipalities have failed to meet. See New Homes Sought for Machines Rendered Useless by
Voting Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at A16.
39. Sheila Parks, Hand Counted Paper Ballots in 2oo8, TIKKUN, Apr. io, 2006,
http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/specials/article.20o6-o4-Io.1693298872.
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new machines explained that she simply did not think that leasing was an
option because it had never been offered.40 In another interview, an official at
one of the largest voting machine manufacturers confirmed that state and
county officials around the country believed that purchases were the standard
way to make full use of their HAVA grants.41
The moment of congressional action in 2002 provided a chance to change
this attitude and an opportunity for many states and counties to switch from
purchasing to leasing. Demand was about to rise dramatically, and the market
for voting machines could have shifted toward leases and away from outright
purchases. Unfortunately, the structure and timing of HAVA grants
squandered this opportunity.
Because funds for upgrading voting machines were available only once-
and had to be spent before the 2006 deadline - states could not save money for
gradual upgrades. Rather, HAVA incentivized states to spend large amounts of
money in long-lasting ways and disincentivized hedging against technological
change via short-term leases. As the Texas "Best Practices Guide" for county
officials states, leasing "may not be for everyone, especially since this is a
onetime allotment of funding from the federal government. Accordingly, some
counties may choose to go ahead with a direct purchase of all the hardware and
a license agreement for all the software. 42
Meanwhile, for the producers of voting machines, HAVA was immediately
recognized as "an unprecedented sales opportunity."43 The major players in the
market at the time of the Act's enactment were aware that the massive national-
scale funding could only be spent for a limited time and that winning market
share would depend primarily on their ability to sell quickly. Thus, "there was
little incentive to develop 'better' machines and every incentive to sell as many
machines as possible."44 These conditions made it difficult for new players to
enter the market quickly enough to compete and have entrenched a preexisting
oligopoly in the voting machine market. By encouraging purchase through its
strict spending deadline, HAVA wasted an opportunity for a longer-lasting
solution to the problem of outdated voting machines.
40. Telephone Interview with Barbara Howard, Assistant County Clerk, Alpine County, Cal.
(July 7, 2006).
41. Telephone Interview with Dick Jablonski, Vice President of Fin., Election Sys. & Software,
Inc. (Apr. 25, 2006).
42. Memorandum from Roger Williams, Tex. Sec'y of State, to All Interested County Officials 2
(Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/hava/pdf/Ieasepurchase-v6.pdf.
43. Warren Stewart, Do You Know How Your Vote Will Be Counted?, WASH. SPECTATOR, Mar. 2,
2006, available at http://www.commondreams.org/viewso6/o3o2-29.htm.
44. Id.
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IV. A LESSON FOR NEXT TIME
It might appear at first that this Comment's central argument proves too
much-that it is unreasonable to blame HAVA for exacerbating the purchasing
trend because states acquired election equipment by purchase even before the
Act was passed in 2002.4 ' But this criticism misses the fact that upgrades of
voting machinery of any kind before the 20oo election were few and far
between. 6
My argument - that leases are preferable to purchases - takes as its baseline
the fact that an infusion of election spending existed to spur upgrades in the
first place. Leases admittedly may not make economic sense when upgrades are
infrequent (as before 2000): in times of low demand, machines will be
produced to order only after a purchaser has been found, and thus lease price is
likely to approach purchase price. By contrast, in times of high demand, it
becomes possible to produce machines before committed purchasers have been
found (because the chances of landing short-term customers are higher), and
lease prices thus drop. For this reason, offering machinery for short-term leases
is only attractive in high-demand periods;4 7 to become a viable long-term
strategy, the switch to leasing requires a high-demand jumpstart. HAVA, I
believe, was an opportunity for such a jumpstart.
A half-century from now, today's state-of-the-art touch-screen machines
may seem as outdated (and perhaps even as exclusionary) as lever machines
seem to New Yorkers today. Because the latest round of machinery is being
purchased all at once, it will likely mature all at once; the need for a machinery
upgrade will again be national in scope, and states may again turn to Congress
for funding. In other words, there will likely be a "next time."
When that next time comes around, Congress should look to the lessons
learned in implementing HAVA. Congress could require that upgrade funding
be spent only for leases and could impose a maximum term length. It could
incentivize leasing by providing larger sums to states that agreed to acquire by
lease. Or it could simply facilitate leasing by dispensing money over time. In
this way, Congress could truly make the concept of outdated voting machines
"a part of our history, not our future." 8
BRANDON FAIL
45. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
46. Telephone Interview with Dick Jablonski, supra note 41.
47. Id.
48. H.R. REP. No. 107-329, at 32 (2001).
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